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Fighting corruption has played a prominent role in
research in the last 15 years.Countries where bribery
and embezzlement among public servants and politi-
cians are effectively contained allocate capital more
efficiently, grow faster, preserve the environment,
attract investors, avoid inequality in income and
wealth,enhance trust in politics and foster happiness
among its citizens (Lambsdorff 2007).The empirical
evidence is strong and has focused attention on the
necessity of good governance.
At the same time there is little consensus on how
to contain corruption. Some economists have ad-
vocated the idea that corruption is necessarily
a consequence of bureaucracy and government.
Downsizing the public sector was thus seen as a
remedy. The resulting implementation of privati-
zation and deregulation has often failed, however,
and even led to increased rather than decreased
corruption. Political reform, such
as strengthening participatory
government, democracy and de-
centralization, are guiding prin-
ciples in their own right, but do
not necessarily offer the silver bul-
let that helps reduce overall cor-
ruption. Instead they can gener-
ate transitory problems that may
easily go along with increased
corruption.
Legal reform has been given con-
siderable attention lately, particu-
larly in connection with criminal
law. Milestones include the 1997
OECD convention, where all member states commit-
ted themselves to enact laws criminalizing the bribery
of foreign officials and in 2003 the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, where 140 signing
states agreed to fight corruption in all of its forms.
There is a widespread consensus that incentives for
citizens,businesspeople,politicians and public servants
must be created that discourage bribery. It should be
turned from a high profit and low risk strategy to a
risky activity that promises only little gain. But what
are the risks that corrupt actors are exposed to? And
how can we modify them? There is little doubt that
severe penalties and high risks of detection are crucial.
But can such an approach be successful when prose-
cutors are not independent,judges poorly paid,lobby-
ists masters of camouflage,businesspeople in search of
legal loopholes and politicians willing to offer benefits
for a price? 
Approaches to anticorruption
Given the difficulties of fighting corruption, the
chances for good governance frequently appear
rather poor, particularly when observing how costly
it may be to pay high salaries in the public sector and
maintain necessary control mechanisms.
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Figure 1This may explain why, as shown in Figure 1, there is
a strong correlation between poverty and corrup-
tion. Rich countries such as Luxembourg, Norway,
Denmark, Germany or the United States perform
much better than poor countries such as Zimbabwe,
Afghanistan or Myanmar. Some outliers, however,
are also noteworthy. Countries endowed with raw
materials such as Saudi Arabia, Equatorial Guinea
and Russia are rich but marked by higher levels of
corruption. Other countries such as Chile, Jordan or
Botswana are rather poor but still successful in con-
taining corruption. Can they teach us a lesson? 
Data on convictions related to fraud are also illus-
trative (even when recognizing that definitions and
aggregation may differ from one country to anoth-
er). More convictions suggest that a higher level of
deterrence is achieved. This helps reduce perceived
levels of corruption, as shown in Figure 2. Yet, the
correlation is rather poor. One is tempted to reason
that convictions in court may explain only a small
fraction of the risk faced by potential perpetrators.It
is noteworthy to see Chile again as an outlier. The
number of convictions is rather small relative to the
country’s success in containing corruption.
Corrupt reciprocity
In addition to deterrence there are numerous other
preventive measures that are salient in reducing cor-
ruption. These range from eliminating distorting
state intervention, simplification of rules and proce-
dures, to administrative rules or procurement law.
I want to discuss one aspect that has become the fo-
cus of scrutiny lately. Corruption
is an arduous type of business, and
one approach for reform concen-
trates on rendering corrupt trans-
actions even more troublesome.
Bribe paying companies are often
betrayed. After receiving a pay-
ment, public servants and politi-
cians fail to deliver the promised
service. Other companies are ex-
torted, threatened with criminal
prosecution or forced to pay an-
other bribe.The Wall Street Jour-
nal (31 January 2007) reported
the prosecutorial investigation of
M. Kutschenreuter, an executive
manager at the German Siemens.
A former Saudi-Arabian local representative, whose
contract had been cancelled by Siemens, he alleged-
ly blackmailed the firm. He requested more than
USD 900 million as hush money and threatened to
pass on documents about corruption in telecommu-
nications contracts to the SEC. In negotiations both
sides agreed on a payment of  USD 50 million.
This case study is symptomatic for corrupt transac-
tions. The risks of mutual betrayal are manifold, as
the following cartoon illustrates.Corruption requires
criminal expertise. Money flows must be camou-
flaged,measures against blackmailing must be taken,
and, foremost, the enforcement of promised services
must be ensured.Those who engage in this business
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“A man of principle. He accepted the bribe but he wouldn’t 
give me the license because that would be against the rules”
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delve into a criminal sphere in which networks are as
important as mutual trust. Trust, on the other hand,
must be complemented by credible threats to retali-
ate malfeasance (Gambetta 2009).
This is well illustrated by another recent case, docu-
mented on 26 June 2007 by the Süddeutsche Zei-
tung. In a recent trial in Munich, Germany, Holger
Pfahls was charged with accepting bribes while hold-
ing a position of a defense secretary under former
Chancellor Helmut Kohl from 1989 to 1992.He was ac-
cused and found guilty of accepting the equivalent of
almost EUR 2 million from German-Canadian busi-
nessman Karlheinz Schreiber for pushing through a
deal to deliver 36 Fuchs armored vehicles to Saudi
Arabia. In court Mr Pfahls is quoted as giving the fol-
lowing description of the alleged briber (own transla-
tion): “Schreiber told me that I was just one out of
many who receives bribes. When Schreiber hates
someone, his hatred is so profound that he wants to
destroy him, even if that means his own demise. On
the other hand, he is a real buddy, highly talented in
creating a pleasant atmosphere.” Mr Schreiber has
mastered the skill of creating a pleasant trusted at-
mosphere while at the same time threatening retalia-
tion,forcing his counterparts to honor their promises.
Empirically there is also a strong correlation between
the likelihood to pay a bribe and confidence in cor-
rupt reciprocity. Figure 3 shows data from a 2009
worldwide survey of households (Transparency Inter-
national 2009).Households in 66 countries were asked,
first, whether they paid a bribe in the last 12 months
and,second,whether the delivery of the corrupt service
is certain after making such payments. As shown, the
likelihood of paying bribes increases with the certain-
ty of delivery. Among households that are extremely
certain about the delivery 28 percent pay bribes. But
only 13 percent of households pay bribes if they are
extremely uncertain whether a bribed public official
will deliver the corrupt service.
This finding provokes a novel approach to reform.
The frequency of bribery can be reduced by render-
ing reciprocity uncertain, by undermining the stabil-
ity of corrupt transactions. I labeled this method for
anticorruption “the principle of the invisible foot”
(Lambsdorff 2007, 2009). The wording is chosen in
line with the well-known economic principle of the
invisible hand. Outcomes desired by society can be
achieved without altruistically motivated individuals.
In the words of Adam Smith (1776, 16): “It is not
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or
the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest.” The invisible hand of
market competition assures the desired outcomes.A
mechanism is in place that substitutes for a lack of
individual morality.
This poses the question whether we have a similar
mechanism at our disposal for ensuring good gover-
nance. Can there be good governance without bene-
volent politicians and without altruistic public ser-
vants? Competition does not represent this type of
mechanism, because corrupt politicians may have an
edge over their competitors in gaining funding, re-
cruiting loyal followers and organizing majorities for
their goals. But the principle of the invisible foot may
give rise to hope.Actors who are willing to engage in
corruption often end up being the victims of betrayal.
They may fail to profit from bribery and lose their
reputation for honest business. Abstaining from cor-
ruption may then be motivated by
self-interest.Temptations to give or
take bribes may be rejected not
due to moral concern but because
of the inherent uncertainty that
surrounds such deals.
Perspectives for reform
A plethora of proposals emerge
once we approach corruption from
this perspective.For example,due
to their uncertainty, corrupt trans-
actions are often arranged by spe-
cialized agents experienced in cam-
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Figure 3ing legal appearance to seemingly corrupt deals and
enforcing illegal transactions. Intermediaries enjoy
the advantage of being return customers. While a
stranger may easily be cheated, intermediaries pro-
mise future business and can spread an individual’s
reputation as either being a cheater or an “honest”
criminal.Making life harder for intermediaries could
thus be an important approach to reform (Lambs-
dorff 2011).Intermediaries may be required to regis-
ter their business and be subject to annual auditing,
which would prevent them from passing on parts of
their commissions as bribes.
Equally important is the observation that not all
penalties and types of deterrence are advisable. This
is particularly apparent with rigid gift-taking limits.
Such measures may render the minor sinners de-
pendent on a briber. After an innocent error they
can become hostage to someone who was giving
them a gift beyond the allowed limit. For many this
marks the beginning of a corrupt career. Their ini-
tial perpetration makes them reliable partners for
future corrupt transactions. The gift-limit rule
serves to strengthen the stability of future corrupt
transactions rather than to help the minor sinners
protect their integrity. Instead of rigid rules it would
be better to train employees how to deal with con-
flicts of interest, to sort out possible previous mis-
takes and to regain a life of justice. Conversely,
those who bribe public servants and make them de-
pendent deserve less backslapping.
Gender equality
Gender equality has been found to be closely relat-
ed to the success in fighting corruption.There is sig-
nificant evidence that a larger share of women in the
working population and in parliament goes along
with lower perceived levels of corruption, alas, with
uncertain causality (Swamy et al. 2001). But causa-
tion has been ascertained in experimental investiga-
tions,which revealed that women differ in their reac-
tion to bribes. While men have a tendency to recip-
rocate, for example by delivering a contract to the
briber, women are willing to act opportunistically,
taking a bribe while cheating the briber (Lambsdorff
and Frank 2011). Women are commonly found to
exhibit a high sense of fairness and the avoidance of
behavior that contributes to inequality.But they were
not found to apply a higher moral standard in cor-
rupt transactions;rather they had a reduced sense of
reciprocity.
Men, on the other hand, are more willing to recipro-
cate but also to retaliate if they are cheated, even if
this is costly to them.This suggests that women may
be preferable for routine inspections, in workplace
situations that are comparable to the anonymous
setting that was tested in the experimental laborato-
ry.Men,on the other hand,may need more rigid gift-
limit rules, given that they cannot take gifts without
an inclination to reciprocate.
The four-eyes principle
Subjecting individual decisions to peer review is a
standard organizational method. Individuals often
tend to follow narrow, selfish interests which may
overshadow the pertinent concerns. Having a sec-
ond, independent person supervise important deci-
sions is thought to ensure that a control mechanism
is in place. Reports on anticorruption in the public
sector thus often emphasize a rigid application of the
four-eyes principle as a method for containing cor-
ruption. Bribing two, it seems, is more demanding
than bribing just one decision maker.
What appears most intuitive to the layman has been
critically challenged by laboratory experiments.
Schikora (2010) employs a game similar to the one
by Lambsdorff and Frank (2011),where bribe-takers
can cheat the briber. He compares one treatment
played among individuals with a treatment where
bribe-takers decide in groups of two. Only if both
agree to the bribe will it be accepted. Nonetheless
there is more bribery in the group version. This is
because the game is played repeatedly and as a re-
sult issues of reputation become salient.The experi-
ments show that groups follow a maximizing strate-
gy more than individuals do and are better at culti-
vating a reputation for reliable reciprocity. The mu-
tual control exercised between two actors backfires,
because rather than serving the public it is employed
to uphold the actors’ corrupt reputation. Thus re-
search casts doubt on naïve expectations regarding
the four-eyes-principle. How peer review should be
organized to better contain risks of corruption will
thus be food for future research.
Asymmetric penalties
Bribery differs from many other forms of crime in
that it involves two perpetrators. It suffices for law
enforcers to convince just one of the perpetrators to
collaborate and self-report. Take a simple thought
experiment.A briber is allowed to keep the awarded
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contract and entitled to claim back the bribe if he
reports the infraction to prosecutors.Bribery and sub-
sequent reporting is turned into an attractive strate-
gy. Such a provision would be quite unfair, but also
quite effective.A bribe-taker will recognize these in-
centives and,fearing the increased probability of de-
tection, be inclined to reject bribes (Yadlin 2006).
Self-reporting combined with leniency would thus be
a valuable tool in destabilizing corrupt transactions.
In contrast, if both briber and bribe-taker face iden-
tical penalties, these embed the two perpetrators in-
to mutual dependence and silence.
But leniency programs must be fine-tuned so as not
to backfire. Feess and Walzl (2004) warn that incen-
tives given to those who report should not be exces-
sive. What is even more important is how to deal
with perpetrators who deceive each other. Imagine
that a briber is still waiting for his contract to be
awarded and is fearful that the bribe-taker may
cheat. Will the briber be entitled to obtain leniency
in exchange for reporting? Obviously, this type of
leniency would backfire. If those who are cheated
are invited to report, bribe-takers will not dare
cheat. This type of leniency would enhance corrupt
reciprocity and support the enforcement of bribe
transactions (Buccirossi und Spagnolo 2006).
There are two models for taking care of these con-
cerns. One approach would be to penalize bribe-giv-
ing but not bribe-taking. In the 1990s in Chile the
payment of a bribe was a criminal offense, but
accepting a bribe was not unless accompanied by an
abuse of office.Even today Chile’s Codigo Penal,the
criminal code, is strict with respect to extortion, mis-
appropriation, falsification of information and fraud
but little punishment is added when these infractions
are carried out in exchange for a bribe (Rose-
Ackerman 2010, 222). The advantage is that bribe-
takers are free to cheat bribers, without fears of re-
prisal. This model can also be linked to leniency
towards bribers in exchange for reporting.As long as
they do not receive the promised contract they are
not in a position to threaten the bribe-taker.
Another option would be to reverse the onus of proof
and grant leniency to any perpetrator, the briber or
the bribe-taker,who can prove to have cheated their
counterpart.While this option would also destabilize
corrupt transactions, currently there is no country or
institution where experience with such provisions
has been gathered. More research is required to de-
velop this thought experiment into rules than can be
implemented.
Contract penalties
Monetary fines linked to business contracts can also
be helpful in containing corruption.For example,the
general terms and conditions of purchasing of the
Deutsche Bahn AG (Allgemeine Einkaufsbedingun-
gen AEB) set a fine of up to 7 percent of the gross
accounted sum to be paid by a contractor who pays
a bribe. Similar provisions can be found in the US
Sentencing Guidelines.Also the “integrity pacts” by
Transparency International incorporate similar types
of fines. In my opinion a fine of 30 times the amount
of the bribe would be adequate. Such a value would
correlate with the advantage achieved by the bribery
,i.e., a light penalty for the flowers given to a low-
level clerk and severe sanctions for transferring large
sums of money to key decision makers.
Another advantage of such fines is that they are
borne by companies, not individuals alone. Compa-
nies will lose the incentive to induce their employees
to pay bribes. Not only would the employees risk
penalties, the companies would also face the risks of
monetary fines.There are further advantages to such
fines. The circumstances for detecting a malfeasance
can be taken into account. Imagine a manager who
hears about allegations of a bribe paid by a subordi-
nate to secure a contract, contrary to the manager’s
policy. But should the manager investigate the case
further, as required by his supervisory duty? Imagine
that his company would have to pay a fine. Wouldn’t
it then be in the corporate interest to destroy all evi-
dence rather than bringing them to light? Monetary
fines are then at risk of generating adverse incentives.
The downside effects of monetary fines can be
avoided by granting leniency in cases of self-report-
ing (but keep in mind that leniency may not be
granted if the company was cheated and the paid
bribe was not reciprocated). Such provisions would
enhance the manager’s incentives to investigate the
allegation, in order to secure lenient treatment for
the company. This is an advantage of fines as com-
pared to blacklisting,where potential leniency is pos-
sible only at the discretion of prosecutors or the pro-
curement agency.It is also superior to provisions that
render the contract obtained by help of bribery null
and void, as such provisions do not deter unsuccess-
ful bribery that was not reciprocated.Monetary fines
are also superior to liability for damages to the prin-
cipal and the competing bidders,as they can be made
dependent on a company’s effort to come forward
with evidence and report the infraction.Conclusion
As this article explained, corrup-
tion is not only reduced by deter-
rence such as is provided by a strict
criminal code and a high risk of de-
tection. It is also undermined by
the risk that bribes may not be
reciprocated.
Why is Chile successful in fighting
corruption? Why is it widely per-
ceived to exhibit low levels of bri-
bery despite being rather poor and
not diligent in convicting fraud-
sters? One explanation might be
its described policy of penalizing
bribe-giving but not bribe-taking,
which makes it attractive to take bribes without recip-
rocating them.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 4, Chileans are particu-
larly uncertain with respect to corrupt reciprocity.
More than 32 percent respond that after paying a
bribe it is extremely uncertain whether the promised
favor will be returned.Among 66 countries this was
the second highest value.A policy that effectively in-
hibits corrupt reciprocity rather than exercising
zero-tolerance towards gift-takers is likely to explain
Chile’s success. Rather than focusing on a policy of
zero-tolerance, a more tricky avenue is advisable.
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